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This paper reports the barriers to regional collaborative procurement from an empirical study 
of five UK public authorities in the emergency services sector. Despite political pressure to 
collaborate, strategic responses of institutional logics, protectionism and symbolic tick boxing 
legitimise stakeholder resistance to isomorphic forces and entrench operational barriers. The 
findings expose choice mechanisms in public procurement by exploring tensions arising from 
collaborative procurement strategies within, and between, organisations.  Multiple 
stakeholders’ perspectives add to current thinking on how organisations create institutional 
logics to legitimise their actions. The Economic and Social Research Council and the 
Technology Strategy Board supported this work.  
 
Introduction 
The UK public sector spent £109billion on the procurement of goods and services in 2013 
(HM Treasury, 2013b).  The 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review saw the UK government 
embark on a reduction of public sector spend and the implementation of a period of austerity, 
which underlines the centrality of financial resources in the public sector (Kioko, Marlowe, 
Matkin, Moody, Smith and Zhao, 2011).  Public sector collaboration is seen as an imperative 
to deliver value for money (HM Treasury, 2013a) but gaps exist in understanding its origins, 
prevalence and impact on organisational performance (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow and 
Tinkler, 2006; Wright and Pandey, 2010).  Collaborative procurement is increasingly on the 
public policy agenda (Walker, Schotanus, Bakker and Harland, 2013) as it can provide 
savings, promote financial transparency, rationalise specifications and simplify evaluation 
processes (Gobbi and Hsuan, 2015).  Despite studies exploring collaboration with public 
service providers (see, Kioko et al., 2011; Hefetz and Warner, 2012; Lamothe and Lamothe, 
2012) there is a paucity of research on member organisations and the barriers and enablers of 
collaborative public procurement (Walker et al., 2013).   
 
Institutional theory explains how organisations are influenced by their environmental context 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987).  It can be a useful 
lens to explore current public management challenges, as it suggests that achieving legitimacy 
through conforming to key stakeholders’ expectations takes primacy over achieving 
efficiency (Ashworth, Boyne and Delbridge, 2009). Collaborative procurement policies create 
tensions between cost, compliance and quality considerations across intra-organisational 
stakeholder groups, and between inter-organisational collaborating authorities, where 
different social values, rules and rationalities may exist.  
There have been calls for public procurement research that shifts the focus beyond transaction 
cost and rational decision making perspectives to encompass broader collaborative 
governance and behavioural aspects (Hefetz and Warner, 2007; Hefetz and Warner, 2012; 
Lamothe and Lamothe, 2012; Walker et al., 2013). This paper contributes to a deeper 
understanding of how stakeholders resist and legitimise pressures to collaborate through 
exposing the underlying determinants of strategic responses to institutional pressures.  Covert 
strategic responses (Oliver, 1991) entrench overt operational barriers through the use of 
institutional logics, protectionism and symbolic tick boxing, underpinned by a need to display 
external legitimacy and to protect autonomous decision-making abilities at local levels. The 
focus on stakeholder resistance contributes to a call in institutional research to fill the gaps in 
understanding the role of people and how they make sense of their decision-making relative 
to their contexts (Hallett and Ventresca, 2006).  
 
UK public procurement  
The UK public procurement landscape is fragmented. There are approximately 50 
professional procurement organisations as well as individual public bodies operating 
framework agreements for goods and services (National Audit Office, 2010). Framework 
agreements are subject to EU procurement rules and they set out terms and conditions under 
which specific purchases (call-offs) can be made throughout the term of the agreement (OGC, 
2008). In the UK emergency services, individual authorities are responsible for their own 
procurement and some framework agreements are used at sector, regional or national levels 
with call-off ordering from these contracts locally retained. Collaborative procurement 
between authorities can lower prices, reduce transaction costs, exchange knowledge, improve 
quality and procurement processes (Schotanus, Bakker, Walker and Essig, 2011) and reduce 
the duplicated hierarchies of procurement functions (Dunleavy et al., 2006).   
 
Maintaining integrity in decision-making is a fundamental pillar of public procurement 
(Schooner, 2002), and in some jurisdictions is viewed as the primary goal of competitive 
bidding (Dekel, 2008).  The achievement of value for money is at the heart of UK public 
procurement policy (House of Commons, 2014).  Value for money is defined as “securing the 
best mix of quality and effectiveness for the least outlay over the period of use of the goods or 
services bought” (HM Treasury, 2013a, A4.6).  Despite the clear mandate to deliver value for 
money in its widest sense, the need for public bodies to meet propriety and transparency 
requirements through compliance with the European Union Public Procurement Directives 
can take precedence over more commercial goals (Erridge, 2007). Value for money requires 
balancing costs with quality.  In the case of the emergency services, value for money ensures 
cost considerations do not compromise operational responsiveness and resilience.   
 
Institutional theory and legitimacy 
Institutional theory acknowledges that organisations’ structures are influenced by social 
values that are typically taken-for granted, widely accepted and resistant to change (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977). One aspect of institutional theory suggests that organisations conform to 
external environmental pressures to demonstrate their legitimacy to key stakeholder groups 
(Ashworth et al., 2009).  Conforming to shared norms enhances the perceived legitimacy of 
organisations, protects them from external pressure and scrutiny, and enhances their potential 
for survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995).  Legitimate activities resonate with 
the shared understanding among stakeholder groups of acceptable standards of performance, 
and in regulated environments legitimacy can take a more dominant role than enhancing 
economic performance (Zucker, 1987; Deephouse, 1996). The socially constructed patterns of 
practice, and the assumptions, beliefs and values that underpin the meaning of legitimate 
practices are referred to as institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999).  Institutional 
logics are important as they provide mechanisms to drive change, and crucially, also enable 
changes to be resisted through sustaining the legitimacy of current practice and shared values.   
 
To acquire or maintain legitimacy, organisations respond isomorphically to their institutional 
environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Isomorphism refers to 
the degree of homogeneity between organisations caused by the internalisation of external 
influences (Frumkin and Galaskiewicz, 2004; Ashworth et al., 2009). Isomorphic responses 
are classified as: coercive, referring to convergence of responses driven by compliance or 
legislation; normative, seen through adherence to professional standards; or mimetic, where 
an organisation copies the structures and/or practices of others that are seemingly successful 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). An important consideration in institutional research is to 
recognise that organisations, and decision-makers within organisations, are active rather than 
passive in their responses (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and through institutional logics 
actors can create and legitimise change or resistance to change (Suddaby and Greenwood, 
2005).  Strategic responses have been classified on a varying passive-active scale of 
resistance from acquiescence, compromise, avoiding, defying, through to manipulation 
(Oliver, 1991).   
 
Collaborative public procurement 
Public procurement’s role is to ensure regulatory compliance, prudent use of the public purse 
and third-party delivery of contracted goods and services (Russell and Meehan, 2014).  The 
centralisation of public procurement is a growing worldwide trend to achieve efficiencies 
(Albano and Sparro, 2010; Walker et al., 2013) and requires a level of collaboration between 
authorities. Collaborative procurement refers to two or more buying organisations working 
together, pooling knowledge and purchasing power, to increase buyer-side leverage in the 
market and/or to deliver other economies.  Economies of scale provide commercial benefit 
through increased volumes coupled with product rationalisation and standardisation (Joyce, 
2006).  Economies of process reduce duplications in tendering and provide supplier 
management efficiencies (Trautmann, Bals and Hartmann, 2009). Knowledge sharing 
between collaborators provides economies of information through the development of 
purchasing expertise (McCue and Pitzer, 2000).  
 
Institutional theory suggests that coercive governmental pressure would push public 
authorities to adopt collaborative procurement. Unfortunately, collaboration is notoriously 
conflict-ridden and challenging to manage (Amirkhanyan, 2009).  Barriers to collaborative 
public procurement include lack of standardised product coding, lack of strategic buying, 
resistance from suppliers, reliance on suppliers’ data and a lack of market consideration 
(Walker et al., 2013). Despite the political rhetoric there is currently no mandatory 
commitment for procurement collaboration in the UK public sector as the complexities of 
compulsion together with the potential to compromise the delivery of locally-appropriate and 
locally-accountable solutions are recognised (CLGC, 2014).  The relative force of the real 
need to deliver commercial efficiencies against the desire to retain local control of 
procurement decisions creates institutional pressures on how authorities respond to 
collaborative procurement.  
 
In the UK, public sector organisations share similar goals, regulatory environments, structures 
and procurement needs, arguably increasing their potential for collaborative procurement 
(Schotanus et al., 2011; Walker et al., 2013). In the emergency services, front-line co-
operation between authorities is essential particularly for cross-border incidents and despite 
operational challenges, organisations can work together effectively at the local level without 
higher-order legal harmonisation (Princen, Geuijen, Candel, Folgerts and Hooijer, 2014).  
Professional codes of cross-border cooperation capture the behavioural expectations 
(Ashworth et al., 2009) and create normative forces to collaborate (Princen et al., 2014).  
 
Despite the apparent suitability of collaborative procurement and normative pressure for its 
use, the austere economic climate can change the desire for collaboration if organisational or 
personal positions are threatened.  Individual organisations are unlikely to seek collaborative 
solutions if a consequence might involve the loss of their own resource (Flynn, 2007), 
creating dilemmas between optimising outcomes for individuals, departments, organisations 
and taxpayers. Resistance to collaboration can arise across institutions and at the institution-
individual interface leading to legitimising behaviours that portray goal congruence yet 
conceal incompatible goals (Oliver, 1991; Vangen and Huxham, 2011). Organisations with 
unique attributes are better positioned to resist isomorphic pressures (Hefetz and Warner, 
2007).  Unique attributes usually centre on innovation, although the emotive nature of 
emergency service organisations may provide resistant qualities. The legitimacy of public 
sector collaboration reflected in the literature rests on its commitment to public justification 
(Johnston, Hicks, Nan and Auer, 2011), yet there is little known to date of the legitimacy of 
not collaborating and how such resistance is normalised within an organisation.  
 
Empirical context 
This research is set in the emergency services sector and covers five neighbouring authorities 
(anonymised) in the UK. Each authority has a separate procurement team and different 
organisational structures, with one authority outsourcing procurement and another 
outsourcing their accounts payable function. Regional and national collaborative structures 
exist and a regional management board was tasked with delivering an integrated service and 
collaborative procurement. A National Procurement Board (NPB) provides a forum to 
promote collaborative benefits nationally and at regional/sub-regional levels. Collaborative 
procurement was a key strand of the UK government’s 2008-9 Operational Efficiency 
Programme (OEP) (HM Treasury, 2009).  The second National Procurement Strategy (2009-
12) specifically focused on collaboration. The OEP recommended that 80% of common 
central government spend and 50% of all available wider public sector spend should be 
channelled through collaborative frameworks. Authorities were strongly encouraged, but not 
mandated, to coordinate requirements through the NPB. Other collaborative mechanisms 
existed through a regional working group consisting of the heads of procurement and 
numerous technical collaborative groups at a regional level. Despite high-level support for 
collaborative procurement in all five organisations the uptake was low.  
 
Methods 
An action research based case study of the geographical region was the focus of the analyses. 
Through a two-year ESRC/TSB funded Knowledge Transfer Partnership, the research team 
was commissioned by the regional management board to complete the project and were 
granted unique access across all five authorities ensuring the results are truly anchored in 
practice (Yin, 1994). One researcher was seconded to work with the five authorities for the 
project’s duration.  Researchers were given open access to individuals and internal 
information providing contextually-rich data (Barratt, Choi and Li, 2011).   The access gave 
opportunities to attend operational meetings, observe, map and explore decision-making 
processes, engage with key decision-makers and influencers and interrogate supporting 
documentary evidence of spend data, strategy documents and internal communications.  The 
multi-stakeholder approach addresses the risk of homogeneity of responses noted in previous 
studies that only gathered data from procurement staff (Walker et al., 2013).  As illustrated in 
Figure 1, the unit of analysis is the region with multiple embedded units of assessment 
(Barratt et al., 2011). The strategies and structures for regional collaborative procurement are 
consistent across the five organisations but they have diverse operational considerations as 
some service metropolitan areas while others are predominantly rural.  
 
Figure 1:  Units of analysis 
 
 
Six representative spend workstreams were selected as the empirical focus based on the 
significance of aggregated spend, potential for collaboration and potential impact. The 
workstreams selected were two revenue categories (operational equipment and maintenance 
spares) two capital categories (vehicles and ICT) and two service categories (consultancy and 
training). Collectively these six areas had a combined annual spend of circa £30M.  Internal 
stakeholders (N=70) participated in interactive discursive process mapping workshops (one 
for every workstream in every authority; 30 in total) to capture embedded knowledge (Tuggle 
and Goldfinger, 2004), assess levels of collaboration and highlight constraints and barriers. 
Process maps can identify problem areas as issues are visible and transparent (Klotz, Horman, 
Bi and Bechtel, 2008) and are suited to projects requiring cross-functional collaborations, 
tangible cost reduction (Wang, Zhao and Zhang, 2009) and change (Fenton, 2007).  
Stakeholders were classified generically as; Users (departmental heads, technical staff, 
requisitioners, budget holders, end users); Procurement (procurement officers, buyers, 
procurement managers, procurement directors); and Executives (finance executives, accounts 
payable managers, finance heads). 
 
Process mapping workshops lasted two-three hours and typically comprised of a procurement 
manager, requisitioner, technical manager, budget holder, buying assistant, stores supervisor 
(if a stocked item), finance officer and systems manager.  Process maps were constructed 
using colour-coded cards to signify activities, outputs and decision points. Participants wrote 
key activities on the cards and placed them on a large template, pre-printed with generic 
functional areas (horizontally zoned) and generic stages in the purchasing cycle (vertically 
zoned).  Participants used their own wording to describe the stages of the activity (Powney, 
1988).  Participants ‘walked through’ completed maps as a group and on separate cards 
identified and discussed the barriers to collaborative procurement.  This holistic view of the 
procurement process facilitated interactions between individuals and allowed them to build on 
each others’ responses (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990).  The research team took extensive 
notes throughout the workshops and photographs of the maps were taken for reference.  
Workshop data were supplemented with 1:1 open interviews with key decision-makers 
(procurement heads, budget holders) who held specific regional roles related to collaboration 
and with influencers who did not necessarily interact directly with operational actions 
(executives, departmental managers, standards and policy technicians). Interviews explored 
the barriers raised in the workshops capturing the strategic and political dimensions 
influencing collaborative procurement in addition to the rational and technical elements often 
prioritised in management literature (Hefetz and Warner, 2012).  Interviews lasted between 
one-two hours.  
 
The process maps were input into Microsoft Visio process mapping software.  Copies were 
circulated with the discussion notes to the participants for their sign off to ensure accuracy. 
Interview data, process maps and accompanying notes were systematically compared and 
analysed to inductively identify the relationships between activities, people, data and policies 
(Biazzo, 2002). Extensive internal sources provided documentary evidence for triangulation, 
including observational data from 21 regional workstream and/or functional collaborative 
meetings, organisational documents, policy statements, internal communications, spend and 
contract databases, minutes and regional strategy review documents.  The barriers to 
collaborative procurement identified were logged onto a stakeholder map, grouped by generic 
role.  Cyclical grounded analysis of the data was reviewed against institutional theories to 
locate the underpinning values, beliefs and behaviours related to the espoused barriers.  The 
analysis identified operational-level barriers between stakeholder groups (see figure 2) and 
the isomorphic pressures and strategic resistant responses used (figure 3).   
 
Results and discussion 
 
Figure 2:  Stakeholders’ perceived barriers to regional collaborative procurement  
 
Barriers Procurement Executives Users 
Lack of supplier strategy x   
Aggregated spend increases work x   
Need for bespoke contract terms x   
Lack of data x   
Too many suppliers x   
Too many frameworks x   
Unsuitable frameworks x   
Better deals for bespoke contracts x   
Contract standing orders x x  
Approval sign-off procedure x x  
Different systems x x  
Protectionism x x x 
National sector specific frameworks x x x 
Local suppliers for fast response x  x 
Lack of supplier management x  x 
Different life cycles for products   x 
Lack of standardised equipment   x 
Stock condition surveys not aligned   x 
High level plans not aligned  x x 
Supporting 'local' business  x  
Local members' objections   x  
 
Stakeholder perceptions 
Figure 2 illustrates the collaborative procurement barriers identified by participants.  
Procurement’s concerns relate to the supply market and stem from their lack of strategic 
control over frameworks and management of the routes-to-market.  Users echo concerns of 
local supplier management with other barriers relating predominantly to internal 
inconsistencies.  Executives recognise the problems of misaligned strategic plans and have 
concerns over the threats to local relationships and community commitments.  The two 
barriers identified by all stakeholder groups are; inappropriate national sector specific 
frameworks and protectionism by individuals and departments. Procurement are pro-
collaboration as they are judged on savings delivered, and collaboration is seen as a way to 
achieve these (Nollet and Beaulieu, 2003).   Procurement’s push for collaboration creates 
some normative pressure on other stakeholders yet their lack of status compared to technical 
stakeholders minimises this pressure. Normative pressure in the technical professions 
encourages collaboration generally, but concerns arise for collaborative procurement 
specifically, as other departments feel that is reduces local control.  
 
The range of constraints identified represent four emerging themes of; national, regional, 
organisational and individual level barriers. The four themes conceptually illustrate 
individuals’, groups’ and organisational conflicts between protecting professional roles and 
demonstrating compliance to political pressures.  The tensions create conflicts between 
functions and organisations and can prevent best value for taxpayers.  Decision-makers 
legitimise their resistance to numerous isomorphic forces that further heightens the 
operational barriers.  
 
Theme 1: National-level operational barriers - inappropriate national solutions  
All stakeholders felt existing national frameworks, particularly sector specific ones, 
frequently fail to provide optimal solutions and “…for larger requirements, the proposed 
efficiencies don’t materialise”.  This drives a perception that collaborative procurement is not 
beneficial.  Users expressed concern that large-scale frameworks limited innovation resulting 
in supplier complacency, supporting the view that rewarding suppliers for volume not 
excellence can stagnate market innovation (Caldwell, Walker, Harland, Knight, Zheng and 
Wakeley, 2005; Walker et al., 2013).  Concerns were raised that highly leveraged frameworks 
have irreversibly damaged markets and some SMEs no longer traded as a direct consequence. 
While frameworks are not mandatory, and despite the problems aired, all authorities used 
these for major sector-specific requirements owing to significant political pressures.   
 
Executives believed national and even regional procurement conflicts with sustainable public 
procurement as the opportunity to use local SME suppliers in their immediate communities 
was hindered, thus supporting extant research in local government contexts (Walker et al., 
2013). Users had concerns that the removal of local suppliers would damage relationships and 
affect service delivery, particularly for areas requiring regular on-site interaction.  A cautious 
approach, evidenced through a lack of collaboration to stay under spend thresholds enables 
authorities to retain control and supports research on tensions between socioeconomic 
opportunities and cost savings (Knight, Harland, Telgen, Callender, Thai and McKen, 2007).   
 
Theme 2: Regional-level operational barriers – the lack of intra-regional alignment 
The outsourcing of most, or part, of procurement operations by some authorities has led to 
varying levels of control and difficulties in making regional decisions.  Different structures 
create conflicts over whom to collaborate with, particularly for non-emergency-service 
products, with the choice of routes-to-market and potential collaborative partners described 
by one buyer as “overwhelming”.  The numerous frameworks available can dilute volume-
based benefits so they lose their natural efficiencies.  The culture within individual authorities 
is insular; thus, while collaborative procurement is acknowledged by most as “potentially 
beneficial”, as it is not mandatory the coordination of spend is not high on the agenda.  
Pressures to conform can be ignored more easily when regulatory pressure is weak (Quirke, 
2013).  Collaboration was viewed to add extra time and the perception was that “there’s no 
way it would be delivered on time”, adding to the reticence to align. For technical products, 
procurement’s pre-tender design phase is extensive (12months+) to consider specifications, 
locations and operational risk control.  Adherence to performance standards is “crucial” in 
the design of these solutions and users deemed collaboration to be “operationally too risky 
for complex products”. 
 
For capital workstreams procurement derives from an integrated risk management plan, 
typically covering a 6-10 year period. Operational requirements are embedded within each 
authority’s integrated risk management plans limiting collaborative flexibility. Integration 
relates to internal consistency of operational planning rather than being indicative of regional 
collaboration.  Authorities have differing timeframes and review points in these budgetary 
cycles limiting alignment. Although the review points are known across the region and users 
could align these, there is no compelling reason or pressure to do so. Procurement provides 
normative pressure to collaborate but they are generally excluded from operational planning 
decisions and meetings limiting the reach of their pressure.  Plans are continuously reviewed 
but users are reluctant to align these - “It would mean more complications, more delays, extra 
committees and meetings, and we’d end up with a compromised solution for everyone”.   
 
The region has demonstrated that these barriers are not insurmountable and there were 
pockets of successful collaborative procurement.  Numerous stakeholders referred to a 
regional personal protective equipment contract as “best practice collaborative 
procurement”. A regional solution was deemed “better value for money” than either 
individual or national agreements and was subsequently adopted. Operational plans were 
aligned and different authorities came on-line at various stages. Interestingly, the driver for 
this regional collaboration was in response to pressure to align to a national framework.  
 
Theme 3: Organisational-level operational barriers - perceived need for bespoke solutions 
Operational autonomy has led to a lack of standardised equipment.  Product specifications are 
dependent on usage patterns of urban/ rural locations making regional standardisation a low 
priority over safety and operational effectiveness.  However, a lack of standardisation persists 
even in less emotive workstreams where operational risks are negligible.  As an example, 
across the five authorities, 20 fast-moving generic common stores items were analysed; the 
data identified 56 ‘main’ suppliers and 94 different prices despite all suppliers being available 
to all authorities, demonstrating a lack of collaborative knowledge sharing.  Information is 
shared across technical collaborative forums but procurement is not involved in all technical 
forums (and vice-versa) limiting opportunities for collaborative procurement options in the 
exploration phases.  While consensus on complex issues is not necessarily achievable or 
desirable, the lack of cross-functional representation in working groups marginalises the 
commercial challenge in procurement processes.  
 
Theme 4: Individual-level operational barriers - resource pressures 
The fragmented options via national, regional and sector level tendering portals result in 
numerous potential routes-to-market.  Where the ‘best’ deal sits is largely untested and 
resource is not focused on comparative analysis of these, making the decisions malleable to 
changing political pressures and partner allegiances.  The increased time commitments 
needed to run Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) tenders were deemed to cause 
operational issues in fast-paced supply environments where the products may be changing 
faster than the procurement cycle.  Budgetary constraints have stretched resources making it 
increasingly difficult to invest time in these assessments. As pointed out by procurement, 
“frameworks are a quick route to market - we use them when the timescales are tight”. 
 
There is a strong view that scale alone does not always provide the best outcomes and that 
heavily leveraged contracts damage supply chain innovation, particularly for workstreams 
with safety implications. Users spoke of their “moral obligation” and “guardian role” to get 
the best technical products often with minimal commercial attention.  It was considered 
“inappropriate” and “dangerous” to pass this accountability to other authorities that lack 
local context-specific knowledge.  This strong professional core is valued internally within 
authorities but is an area for tension and competition between authorities.  The locally 
grounded expertise provides unique attributes enabling isomorphic pressure for regional 
standardisation to be resisted (Hefetz and Warner, 2007).  
 
Legitimised strategic resistance  
The project enabled the strategic defensive routines employed and the processes of how these 
gain legitimacy to be exposed.  Interestingly, strategic resistance is in direct response to the 
isomorphic pressures encountered, rather than a response to operational barriers, yet as 
operational barriers are rationally orientated, it is to these barriers the participants refer. The 
legitimised resistance heightens the operational barriers, or at least ensures they persist.  
Figure 3 illustrates the operational barriers, isomorphic pressures and strategic responses.  
 
Figure 3: Barriers, Pressures and Resistance in Collaborative Procurement 
Institutional logics 
Institutional logics focus decision-makers attention on issues and solutions consistent with 
their views (Ocasio, 1997; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999).  For collaborative procurement these 
derive from the interplay of two elements, 1) procurement’s lack of status and 2) the emotive 
nature of the emergency services. Lack of authority is evidenced when procurement decisions 
fall to operational or financial roles (Schiele and McCue, 2006). The process maps highlight 
that of all decisions taken in the procurement process, 60% were by users, 19% by executives 
and only 21% by procurement. For complex workstreams procurement’s role is limited 
further to solely checking process compliance.  The lack of status emanates from their 
hierarchical position. Structurally, procurement reports to a Finance Director/Executive, 
which is perceived internally as a lack of status, influence and authority.   
 
Key activities including sourcing and interfacing with suppliers are dispersed to functional 
areas, particularly in technical workstreams. Only exceptionally did supplier management 
become the responsibility of procurement. The majority of stakeholders, including 
procurement themselves, predominantly see procurement’s value in “ensuring process 
compliance”, supporting previous research on legitimacy in decision-making (Erridge, 2007). 
One user referred to procurement as the “process police”. The largely administrative role of 
procurement provides insight into how pressures for collaborative procurement are 
strategically resisted.  At an organisational level, procurement builds normative pressures to 
collaborate, yet their hierarchical position leads to a low degree of internal social legitimacy 
that increases other functions’ ability to resist these changes (Townley, 1997),  who are 
deemed more powerful and legitimate (Dhalla and Oliver, 2013).  
 
The emotive nature of the emergency services is the second element driving the institutional 
logics of the unsuitability of collaborative procurement in the emergency services. The 
dominant institutional logic from technical staff is that collaborative procurement requires 
standardised products that could dilute their professional, legitimised expertise and potentially 
compromise safety.  These logics provide a professional justification for bespoke solutions 
that non-technical staff including procurement and elected members find difficult to 
challenge.  Technical personnel with backgrounds in front-line operations dominate user and 
executive groups that provide credibility and legitimacy to these institutional logics. Views 
are encoded in the deep-rooted mission and culture of the emergency services enabling 
defensive routines to resist change (Ocasio, 1997; Thornton, 2002).  Over time local norms 
emerge relating to product specifications that limit options deemed acceptable (Ashworth et 
al., 2009).   
 
Procurement teams have relevant business qualifications, but no backgrounds in frontline 
operations. As one buyer stated, “I have all the CIPS qualifications and procurement 
experience but that’s not enough if you’re not [frontline] operational your voice isn’t heard”.   
Through creating and embedding a legitimate differentiation from other public sector 
contexts, stakeholders effectively resist mimetic isomorphic pressures to collaborate.  Whilst 
these institutional logics and issues are understandable, and indeed desirable in workstreams 
directly responsible for frontline operational performance, these repertoires were frequently 
used in non-technical, non-frontline operations as a reason for non-collaboration, 
demonstrating their depth of acceptance across the organisations.   
 
Protectionism and symbolic tick boxing 
Protectionism and symbolic tick boxing represent strategic responses to resist coercive 
government pressures for collaborative procurement and normative forces of professional 
communities.  Both responses demonstrate the tensions between resistance and conformity.  
Protectionism is displayed at multiple, embedded levels - organisational, departmental and 
individual, and relates to a perceived threat that collaboration could make individual roles 
redundant through economies of process (Trautmann et al., 2009).  When faced with job 
redundancy threats, people heighten operational barriers and downplay potential benefits. In 
regional collaborative meetings people openly aired their concerns about their future job 
security, although this was often shrouded behind the emotive veil of compromising front-line 
operational resilience if jobs were centralised.   
 
There was evidence that the lack of regional alignment is artificially retained in some 
instances, supporting the view that individual organisations are unlikely to seek collaborative 
solutions if this reduces their own resource (Flynn, 2007).  One user stated, “I’m happy to be 
involved as long as we lead and others align to us”. People often raised concerns of “where 
would collaboration end?” creating a climate of suspicion that regional collaboration could 
lead to, as one user stated “super-regions with no geographic identity” and further loss of 
control and impact on individuals’ job security. When individuals sub-optimise overall 
performance because of these conflicts of interest at a personal versus organisational level, 
they legitimatise their decisions through increasing the saliency of operational barriers 
coupled with strategic responses that create additional barriers or sustain existing ones.  
 
There was no outright defiance (Oliver, 1991), rather low-levels yet persistent avoidance and 
resistance that infused suspicion towards collaborative procurement. Despite the concerns 
voiced over inappropriate national solutions these issues are not formally raised with the 
contracting bodies, which was viewed as “a futile exercise”, and the frameworks are still 
used, albeit reluctantly in many instances. There was a higher usage of collaborative contracts 
in sector-specific workstreams that were visible politically. Symbolic tick boxing conveys 
legitimacy through complying with isomorphic pressures for collaborative procurement while 
simultaneously retaining local decision-making for other less visible spend.   
 
Institutional theory suggests that the inherent legitimacy of national frameworks ensures that 
their use is not questioned and it is in the best political interest of the organisation (and the 
individual) to demonstrate compliance.  Indeed, when describing the benefit of collaborative 
frameworks, participants predominantly used the word “compliant” rather than identifying 
commercial or technical benefits. The desire for organisational effectiveness and legitimacy is 
a less confrontational resistance where reform is promised but delayed (Townley, 1997).  In 
workstreams with a degree of external control and monitoring the response is more likely to 
be strategic (Scott, 2005). Procurement felt similar coercive pressures to use existing 
frameworks, as they are compliant processes, even though they felt they were commercially 
inferior.  Procurement decision-making centres largely on ensuring procedural adherence that 
often obscures other commercial decisions and challenge. Consequently, while both users and 
procurement feel that existing collaborative frameworks are not meeting their needs, the 
legitimacy they provide through regulatory compliance drives their use but creates a vicious 
cycle through further damaging perceptions of the benefits of collaborative procurement.  
 
Table 1: Contract Classifications 
 
Type of Contract Number % of Total 
Individual Authority Agreement 128 80% 
Regional Framework  13 8.1% 
National/Government Framework 10 6.3% 
Other Partner Framework 9 5.6% 
 
Symbolic tick-boxing is evidenced through regional structures that shield internal practice 
from scrutiny through decoupling (Hefetz and Warner, 2012).  Regional and national 
infrastructure facilitates collaborative procurement through technical and functional forums to 
share knowledge and forums are well attended.  Most participants identified these groups as 
evidence of their support of collaboration.  Despite espoused support, there is little tangible 
evidence of collaborative procurement attributed to the groups suggesting only lip service or 
resistant responses to normative pressure (Scott, 2005).  The number of regional collaborative 
contracts registered highlights low levels of activity (see Table 1). 
  
The use of collaborative structures, separate to the decision-making processes, demonstrates 
this decoupling (Duimering and Safayeni, 1998).  While there is infrastructure and some use 
of collaborative frameworks there is a lack of engagement and support for these 
arrangements.  All stakeholders frequently made distinctions between a “tick box” approach 
to collaborative procurement and “effective” collaborative procurement.  The broad 
conceptualisation of collaborative procurement provides opportunities for organisations to 
maintain the pretence of conformity through loosely maintaining collaborative structures to 
provide sufficient ambiguity to evidence compliance.  
 
Conclusions 
The data suggests that the barriers to collaborative procurement are many, complex and 
deeply engrained.  This study contributes to public procurement research by exploring where, 
and why, tensions and conflicts occur in collaborative public procurement strategies, both 
within internal supply chains, and between organisations.  The results show how managers 
reconcile these conflicts and legitimise resistance through symbolic responses to coercive and 
normative pressures. Institutional theory enhances the paper’s explanatory power, principally 
by way of framing our explanation of inter- and intra-organisational resistance to public 
sector austerity measures.  The results contribute a central issue in institutional theory through 
identifying the social processes embedded in rational decision-making processes. By focusing 
on different internal stakeholder perceptions and their motivations, we shed light on how 
organisations legitimise their actions through institutional logics. From an applied 
perspective, for operational managers and public policy-makers the results highlight the 
impact of legitimised resistance to operational outcomes, adding insight into the challenges of 
delivering collaborative procurement for reducing the UK’s financial deficit.  
 
Operational barriers to collaborative procurement persist at national, regional, organisational 
and individual levels.  Although these are not insurmountable, multiple stakeholders are able 
to create strategic responses to isomorphic pressure through institutional logics, protectionism 
and symbolic tick boxing. This research highlights that failure to provide sufficient evidence 
while applying pressure at a political level leads to tick box approaches to collaborative 
procurement risking long-term damage and sub-optimised performance. Given the tensions 
between regulatory, commercial and socio-economic goals (Erridge and McIlroy, 2002) the 
evidence for the benefits of collaborative procurement needs to be beyond dispute.  
 
Legitimacy in decision-making within public procurement reflects the political and strategic 
pressures to demonstrate rationality. In line with institutional theory, if particular courses of 
action enhance perceptions of legitimacy, norms of behaviour emerge that limit choices 
available (Ashworth et al., 2009), even in the face of considerable pressure to reduce costs. A 
challenge for policy makers and individual authorities is the lack of consistent procurement 
data (Cox, Chicksand and Ireland, 2005; Walker et al., 2013).  The evidence base and spend 
data used in public procurement demands urgent attention both from policy makers and 
academics.   
 
Institutional theory is usually applied to organisations operating in competitive markets, 
where isomorphic forces have an inherent motivation; replication of ‘successful’ practices 
minimises risk and contributes to organisational survival, stability or growth.  Whilst this 
might lead to a homogenised ‘iron cage’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), this is at a field level 
rather than targeted at individual decision-makers so the consequences are diffused and take 
time to impact.  In public sector contexts there is little motivation to comply with isomorphic 
pressures and indeed many disincentives. The consequence of collaboration is not risk 
minimisation but a contraction of resource required therefore the threat of redundancy 
increases.  While operational barriers are used overtly as a ‘rational’ defence, covert strategic 
responses of institutional logics, protectionism and symbolic tick boxing protect individual 
positions, legitimise decisions made, and further entrench operational barriers.  The iron cage 
of homogeny (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) still emerges but around individual organisations 
and at a micro level around departments. Thus, this research highlights the criticality of 
understanding underpinning motivation in behaviour in institutional theory and the links 
between operational and strategic processes.  
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